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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Organisational, financial and regulatory conditions for Norwegian public transport have 
changed substantially over the past two decades. Operating subsidies in Norwegian 
conurbations have been reduced dramatically. Changes in the Transport Act, which 
allowed for competitive tendering of public transport operations, were approved by the 
Government in 1991 and set in force in April 1994. Central government transfers to 
county councils, which are responsible for local public transport, have been reduced due 
to the expected efficiency gains in the sector that would arise from the threat of 
competitive tendering. In addition the county councils have adapted to the changed 
regulatory environment for local public transport in a number of different ways. 
 
The operators can compensate for subsidy reductions by reducing service levels, by 
increasing revenues or by improving cost efficiency. We will investigate the 
adjustments made by public transport operators and passengers in order to study how 
they have adapted to the new regulatory and financial conditions. Further, we will 
present a “social welfare balance sheet” which includes the major costs and benefits of 
the developments in the public transport sector. Norheim and Carlquist (1999) 
developed a methodology for this, and we have expanded on their work and findings. 
 
This work concentrates on seven major Norwegian cities: Oslo, Drammen, Stavanger, 
Kristiansand, Bergen, Trondheim, and Tromsø, in the period 1986–1999, see Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The Norwegian cities of Oslo, Drammen, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Bergen, 
Trondheim, and Tromsø. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Norwegian National Transport Statistics and the operators’ annual reports are the main 
data sources for this study. In order to facilitate comparability with Norheim and 
Carlquist (1999), who used times series data for 5 cities between 1986 and 1997, we 
have used the same data set but expanded the number of cities by two and added the 
years 1998 and 1999. We have had to make minor amendments to some definitions and 
have updated some of the previous figures. 
 
The introduction of the diesel duty in 1999 provided a challenge in the data validation 
process. In principle this fuel tax shall be reimbursed to bus companies, which means 
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that it merely represents a shift in both operating costs and subsidies. In reality it has 
proven difficult to separate the fuel duty compensation from other transfers, and 
similarly to separate the diesel duty from other operating costs. On average the 
compensation has been around 95% of the diesel duty. The analyses presented in this 
report exclude costs and subsidies that relate to this tax. 
 
We have described and compared trends for subsidies, costs, fare levels, supply (vehicle 
kilometres per capita) and demand (patronage measured in trips per capita) for the seven 
cities. These findings are presented by way of indices, using 1986 as the base year. A 
number of potential explanatory factors for the various trends are discussed. This part of 
the analysis is semi-qualitative and presents a number of questions for further research. 
In this paper the findings of this part of the analysis are only briefly described. 
 
In order to describe passenger behaviour we have built an aggregated demand model, 
which relates the number of trips per capita to various explanatory variables. This is a 
constant elasticity regression model. In addition to providing new information about 
demand elasticities, the model has also been used to separate the effects of the changes 
in fare and service levels on demand.  
 
The social welfare balance sheet compares public savings obtained from subsidy 
reductions with the costs that poorer service levels and higher fares incur on passengers 
and other areas of society. This is a relatively crude measure for the economic impact of 
the changes in the public transport sector. The approach is not a traditional cost-benefit 
analysis. Rather, it is an annual summary of the impacts of the changes relative to the 
base year 1986. On the benefits side there are the reductions in subsidies, which 
represent a saving. These savings are offset by costs that accrue to passengers and 
others, who experience poorer service levels, fare increases, traffic congestion and 
pollution. 
 
3. TRENDS IN NORWEGIAN URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
 
Norwegian urban public transport in the period from 1986 to 1999 was 
characterised by steeply falling subsidies, decreasing costs and patronage until the 
mid-1990s, increasing real fares and supply increasing with population growth. 
 
Reduced public transport subsidies: In total the annual public transport 
subsidies in the 7 cities were reduced by 42 percent in real prices, and 50% per 
vehicle kilometre. Subsidies fell from about NOK 1.2bn in 1986 to NOK 0.7bn in 
1999, in 1998-prices. Subsidies as a proportion of the costs fell from 45 percent in 
1986 to 26 percent in 1999. However, there is great variation between individual 
cities. In most of the cities subsidies declined steadily till about 1997. Thereafter 
subsidies have risen in most of the areas. Bergen and Trondheim have had the 
largest subsidy cuts, of around 80 percent reduction since 1986, measured per 
vehicle kilometre. The subsidy reductions have rendered Bergen and Trondheim 
with subsidy levels that in 1999 covered only 8 and 4 percent of operating costs, 
respectively. These levels place Trondheim and Bergen among the European cities 
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with the lowest level of subsidies and the highest rates of farebox recovery. See 
Figure A.1. 
 
Operators have become more cost efficient: Our analyses of operators’ 
productivity performance indicate that the potential for cost efficiency gains has 
been exhausted. This partly explains the fare increases in the late 1990s. Average 
costs per vehicle-kilometre fell by 12 percent between 1986 and 1995. Since 1995 
costs have fluctuated around the 1995 level, see Figure A.2. This change of trend 
may have been brought about for several reasons, including Increases in fuel 
prices and labour costs, rising passenger numbers, improved quality standards, 
compensatory measures for previous losses and low subsidy levels, and the need 
for new investments. 
 
Major fare increases: Fare levels, calculated as the average fare box revenue per 
passenger trip, have increased steadily since 1990. In 1999 fare levels were 23 
percent above the base year level in 1986. Bergen and Trondheim, which had the 
largest cuts in subsidies, have also experienced the largest fare increases. This is 
illustrated in Figure A.3. 
 
Supply has kept up with population growth: Supply, measured by mileage 
(vehicle kilometres), is rising in line with increasing population. This means that 
the bus companies in the seven cities produced 16% more vehicle kilometres in 
1999 than in 1986, but measured per capita, the mileage growth is a mere 3%. 
 
Patronage is falling: Demand, measured in passenger trips per capita, fell by 
10% between 1986 and 1992, see figure A.4. Since 1992 demand started rising, 
and increased by 5% by 1999. The demand for public transport in 1999 is thus 
about 5% lower than in 1986. Because of the relatively stable levels of production 
per capita it is likely that the loss of passengers has been caused mainly by the 
large fare increases. Comparing the developments in demand for urban public 
transport with private car use, it is evident that the modal share of public transport 
in Norway has fallen dramatically during the period. Car use rose by about 20% 
on a national level between 1986 and 1999 (Rideng 2000). However, the demand 
trends vary between cities with regards to demand, service levels and fares. The 
increase in total demand since 1992 has mainly been driven by the developments 
in Oslo, which is by far the largest of the seven cities. Since the early 1990s 
service quality has increased substantially in Oslo, due to the integration of 
eastern and western metro networks and a successful customer orientation 
scheme.  
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Profit margins are falling: Operating profits margins fell from around 5% in 1986 to 
below zero in the period 1992-1999. Property sales is one of the key components which 
have compensated for these losses. Profit margins slightly increased in 1998 and 1999. 
 
 
4. AGGREGATED DEMAND MODEL 
 
The data set has enabled us to build relatively robust aggregated demand models based 
on multiple regression modelling. The model has been used to analyse the effects of 
income levels, fare levels, service levels, and petrol price on demand for public 
transport. A time trend has also been included in the model. The main model is a 
constant elasticity model. We have calculated the following elasticities: 
 
Table 1: Elasticities for urban public transport in Norway 
Variable Elasticity 
Income (GNP/capita) -0,40 
Petrol price 0,14 
Fare -0,49 
Vehicle-km per capita 0,66 
 
The model produces a fare elasticity estimate of about 0.5. This fits well into a trend 
towards higher demand sensitivity to prices over time, which is mainly caused by fare 
increases. The proportionate decrease in demand increases as the fare levels rise. An 
alternative model which estimates a proportional price elasticity shows that this is 
indeed the case. This model estimates a fare elasticity equal to -0.05*Price. From the 
operators’ point of view, then, fare levels should not exceed NOK 20, at which stage the 
price elasticity is equal to -1. However, this depends crucially on the socio-economic 
profile of the passengers, fare structure, travel patterns and size of the city. 
 
The model also shows that public transport is an inferior good. That is, when income 
levels rise, demand for public transport falls. This fact represents a major challenge for 
the public transport industry. Service quality must continually improve in order to offset 
this negative effect of income on demand. In the period from 1986 to 1999 the average 
annual increase in GNP has been 2.6 percent, causing a annual drop in demand of 1.1 
percent. 
 
The time trend comprises the effect of omitted variables. The model estimate is an 
annual increase in demand of about 1.1 percent per year. This figure differs from recent 
previous findings by Norheim and Carlquist (1999) and Norheim and Renolen (1997), 
who found a negative time trend. The main reasons for this are the fact that our model 
separates the income effect from the time trend (as opposed to previous studies), and the 
fact that we have not been able to include the substantial improvements in service 
quality that have taken place in some of the cities. (It should be noted, however, that Bly 
and Oldfield (1985) estimated a positive time trend in Norway between 1970 and 1980.) 
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Within the demand model fare and service levels are the explanatory variables that are 
determined within the public transport sector. We have used the demand model to 
estimate the partial and combined effects of the changes in fare and service levels on 
demand. With the exception of Kristiansand, fare increases have caused declining 
demand in all cities. There is more variation in the effects of changing service levels. In 
some cities improved service levels have to some degree offset the negative effects of 
fare increases, whilst in others the combined action of deteriorating service levels and 
increasing fares have reduced demand even further.  
 
Figure 2 shows how fares and service levels (Vkm) have influenced total demand for 
public transport in the seven cities. It shows that relative to 1986 demand in 1999 was 
reduced by about 6 percent on average as a combined result of a 7 percent reduction in 
demand due to fare increases and a 1 percent increase in demand due to improved 
service levels. These are the partial effects of the changes in fares and service levels that 
have taken place in the period keeping all other explanatory variables constant. 
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Figure 2: Partial and combined effects on demand of fares and service levels (Vkm), 
unweighted average of 7 cities. 1986=1.00 
 
 
5. SOCIAL WELFARE BALANCE SHEET 
 
The social welfare balance sheet describes the developments in the public transport 
sector over the period 1986 to 1999. Here, we compare subsidy savings to other changes 
in the sector. The balance sheet includes welfare effects (including marginal external 
costs) of modal shifts, changes in vehicle-mileage, frequency and fares. The net effect 
of these changes constitutes an indicator for social welfare changes.  
 
In a similar analysis, Carlquist and Norheim (1999) also included a calculation of 
changed travel time, motivated by substantial road improvement and construction 
schemes in Bergen. This is a change which has little to do with public transport subsidy 
changes. However, buses enjoy better access and higher operating speeds, which may 
influence service levels and fares. Nevertheless we have not considered this factor to be 
relevant for our analysis. 
U:\ruths\thredbo\thredbo7\Fearn.doc 7 
 
We do not take into consideration perceived quality improvements, as such effects are 
difficult to quantify. This is a limitation of our analysis, especially as quality measures 
can be seen as a consequence of subsidy reductions. This is because public transport 
operators have had an incentive to increase patronage to compensate for the subsidy 
reductions. On the other hand reduced subsidies have led to an increased average age of 
buses (Carlquist 1998) and may have had a negative impact on regularity, thus leading 
to deteriorating quality.  
 
We have not included operating costs in the social welfare balance sheet. We do not 
have sufficient data to develop a cost function for the public transport systems. As the 
companies generally have very low profits, the omission of the cost function will not 
change our conclusions.  
 
We have considered several accumulation principles. In our analysis, all calculations are 
related to 1986 as the base year. E.g. if subsidies are NOK 50 million in 1986, NOK 25 
million in 1987 and NOK 40 million in 1988, the following table describes our 
accumulation principle: 
 
Table 2: Illustration of accumulation principle 
 1986 1987 1988 
Subsidy 50 25 40 
Change since 1986 0 -25 -10 
 
We will also present a total accumulation, i.e. in the above example the total 
accumulated subsidy saving would be (25+10)=35.  
  
The following sections discuss the components which are included in the analysis: 
• Savings from subsidy reductions (public purse savings) 
• Fare changes (costs for passengers) 
• Modal shift costs and costs of increased supply (marginal external costs) 
• Frequency change costs (waiting time) 
 
a) Subsidy changes 
 
We have assumed that a reduction of subsidies (measured in fixed prices) equals an 
identical social welfare saving. We have not included shadow prices of public spending. 
This is a reasonable assumption as savings from the transport sector will be transferred 
mainly to other county council assignments, which involves fairly low transaction costs. 
 
The table below provides an overview of the subsidy changes in the first and second 
half of the period, and during the entire period.  
 
Table 3: Changes in operational subsidies to public transport 1986 - 1992, 1992 - 1999 and 
1986 – 1999. Per cent 
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 1986-92 1992-99 1986-99 
Oslo  -41  +9  -36  
Drammen -40  -48  -69  
Kristiansand +7  +48  +58  
Stavanger +33  -19  +59  
Bergen -26  -64  -74  
Trondheim -62  -83  -94  
Tromsø -29  -6  -33  
All -39  0  -39  
Note that the percentage changes for the two sub-periods do not equal the percentage change for the entire period. 
This is because the base year of the second sub-period is 1992, whereas for the first sub-period and the entire period it 
is to 1986. The numbers do not include the diesel levy compensation which was introduced in 1999. Numbers for 
Kristiansand are for 1997. This also explains why the change total 1992-1999 does not correspond to table 5. 
 
A compensation subsidy for the diesel levy was introduced in 1999. Previous to this, 
public transport enjoyed an indirect subsidy as this sector was exempted from the levy. 
This indirect subsidy has not been included in our analysis. 
 
 
b) Fare increases  
 
If savings from subsidy reductions lead to an equal fare increase, social welfare is 
unchanged although the financing burden has been transferred from the public purse to 
the passengers. Thus the analysis must include fare increases, which offset the benefits 
from the subsidy reductions, in our balance sheet. We have calculated the costs for 
existing passengers in a given year, due to real fare increases (measured by revenue per 
trip) as compared to 1986. We have assumed that a NOK 1 fare increase reduces the 
welfare by NOK 1. 
 
 
c) Costs due to modal change and increased supply 
 
Service and fare level changes will influence demand for public transport, and therefore 
also car traffic. Increased car traffic involves a number of external costs. Eriksen, 
Marcussen and Putz (1999) have studied marginal external costs of transportation. 
These figures apply for large Norwegian cities and include global and local pollution, 
noise, congestion, accidents and infrastructure wear. Our definition of social welfare 
thus includes environmental costs. For Oslo we have assumed that 55 % of public 
transport is rail-based, which yields a lower external cost. A more thorough analysis 
would have to consider the proportion of peak to off-peak traffic. 
 
Table 4: Marginal external costs, 1999-NOK per kilometre 
Private car  1.46 NOK/km 
Bus 8.98 NOK/km 
Public transport in Oslo 6.68 NOK/km 
Source: Eriksen, Markussen, Pütz 1999.  
 
Kjørstad et al (2000) have analysed transfers from use of private car to public transport. 
For four major urban areas, they found that the average proportion of new passengers 
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that originally used a private car was 46.9%. Our analysis includes the changes in 
patronage which are caused by changes in fares and service levels. We have assumed 
that 46.9 % of all new passengers previously travelled by private cars, and similarly that 
46.9 % of patronage reductions are lost to private cars.  
 
We assume that the average trip length is equal for public transport and private car. We 
also assume that the average car occupancy is 1.4 persons. The demand model as 
described above has been used to calculate demand changes. In other words, the isolated 
effects of changed fares and kilometre production has been used to calculate demand 
changes. Thus the analysis includes only factors within the operators’ range of control. 
 
It has been difficult to make good calculations for the change in public transport vehicle 
kilometres that are caused by demand changes. We have chosen to include external 
costs of the entire production increase. The reason for this is that we do not know, based 
on the aggregated figures, how many passengers a departure must lose in order for the 
departure to be withdrawn. There is no clear pattern in the data. However, the data 
indicate that supply is relatively unchanged despite demand changes. This may also 
explain why kilometre production per capita on average has been fairly constant despite 
fall in demand. Therefore we have assumed that the cost of transferred traffic from 
public transport to the private car is merely the cost per new car kilometre, and that the 
public transport production will be maintained. This assumption may be incorrect for 
individual cities, but seems realistic for the seven cities aggregated.  
 
 
d) Costs of frequency changes 
 
A less frequent service implies longer waiting times and therefore costs for passengers. 
There are several problems concerning these calculations. One is the introduction of 
service lines for the elderly and disabled. This yields a less frequent service, but on the 
other hand average walking distance will decrease. Another weakness is that frequency 
estimations based on network kilometre per vehicle hour, and travel surveys showed 
quite different patterns. This might be due to inadequate sample size for the surveys, or 
that the network kilometre data was unreliable. Despite these weaknesses, we have 
included this component as there are substantial variations between the cities and we 
believe we have identified the direction of change for the cities. We have applied a 
valuation of waiting time of NOK 21.28 per hour (Kjørstad et al 2000).  
 
 
Net social welfare effects 
 
The analysis cannot determine in detail to what extent the subsidy cuts have caused 
changes with regard to higher fares, changes service level and increased car traffic. 
Despite this, it is clear that savings for the public purse due to subsidy reductions will be 
offset by changes which in part are due to the subsidy reductions. The table below 
shows that there was a loss in social welfare of NOK 157 million in 1999, compared 
with the 1986 base level. 
U:\ruths\thredbo\thredbo7\Fearn.doc 10 
 
Table 5: Social welfare balance sheet of the developments in the public transport sector. NOK 
million 1998-prices. 1992 compared with 1986, 1999 compared with 1992, and 1999 compared 
with 1986. 
7 cities 1992 v 1986 1999 v 1992 1999 v 1986 
Savings: Reduced subsidies 452 40 493 
Costs:    
  Fare increases 224 200 424 
  Increased vehicle mileage 7 102 109 
  Modal shift 51  14 66  
  Waiting time 50  1 50  
Net saving (benefit) 120 -276 -157 
 
 
In the first half of the period, there was a substantial saving due to reduced subsidies, 
but almost three quarters of this was offset by other components, in particular transfer of 
costs to passengers (increased fares). In the second half of the period, the possibility to 
reduce subsidies was more limited, most likely because the potential for cost efficiency 
gains was diminishing. The fares rose substantially, and the external costs of increasing 
production also increased. This led to a net loss of NOK 276m in the second period.  
 
The findings depend on which year is used as the division line between the two periods. 
Subsidy cuts and the operators’ adjustments vary substantially. Figure 3 illustrates the 
development over time. There was a positive development in net social welfare 
throughout most of the 1990s, although the gains are quite small compared to the 
magnitude of the subsidy cuts. The figure also shows how 1992 was an atypical year. 
This was mainly due to a large subsidy reduction in Oslo.  
 
The most important change was in 1998/1999, when subsidy increases, fare increases 
and external cost increases all contributed to a loss in social welfare. Compared to 1986, 
the loss was 157 million NOK. 
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Figure 3: Social welfare changes compared to base year 1986. Positive values indicate 
welfare gains. NOK million, 1998-prices. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the annual levels as compared to 1986. In order to assess the total net 
savings for the whole period, we have accumulated these annual savings. This total 
accumulated annual social welfare saving is NOK 109 million or NOK 8 million per 
year on average. This is very small compared to the total accumulated public purse 
saving, which is NOK 4.9 billion in the same period. This means that NOK 4.8 billion 
has been transferred to passengers, car drivers and passengers, and society in general. 
Although we cannot conclude that all the negative effects are caused by the subsidy 
cuts, the analysis indicates that subsidy reductions have led to only marginal social 
welfare gains, and that these gains were negative in 1998-1999. 
 
Oslo represents almost 40% of the population in the seven cities studied. In addition, 
Oslo has a public transport system comprising bus, tram and metro networks, whereas 
the other cities with small exceptions have bus systems only. If we separate Oslo and 
the six other cities, it becomes apparent that it is first and foremost the data for Oslo that 
cause the large fluctuations in the social welfare development. The other cities, in 
aggregate, show a more stable development until 1997, but for these as well as for Oslo, 
the development since 1997 has been negative.  
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Figure 4: Annual social welfare savings compared to 1986, divided between Oslo and the six 
other cities. NOK million, 1998 prices. 
 
It is possible to distinguish three periods of change: 
 
• Until 1993 there were substantial social welfare fluctuations. Little stability in the 
subsidy levels in Oslo was the main reason. Between 1990 and 1992 there was a 
considerable net saving in the other cities. This was caused by several components 
in several cities and it has not been possible to analyse this in detail. Our hypothesis 
is that until 1993 it was possible to partly offset subsidy losses by cost reductions, 
and therefore fares and service levels were not as adversely affected in this period. 
 
• Between 1993 and 1997 there was a social welfare gain in Oslo. Subsidies remained 
rather constant in Oslo and there were qualitative improvements, especially due to 
the integration of the eastern and western metro networks. This led to increasing 
patronage. In the other cities, subsidies were reduced and it gradually became more 
difficult to reduce costs, so there was not the same positive development as in Oslo. 
 
• After 1997, there was a social welfare loss in Oslo as well as in the other cities. 
There are a number of reasons for the net cost (negative benefit) that accrued in this 
period. Firstly, subsidies to public transport increased in this period. Secondly, it has 
probably not been possible for operators to cut costs further without also reducing 
the quality of the services offered to the public. The reasons for this are that the 
potential for further cost efficiency has been exhausted, that costs of input factors 
have risen, and that previous adjustments have been sub-optimal in the sense that 
necessary costs and investments have been postponed. 
 
The analysis demonstrates that it is important to distinguish Oslo from the other cities. 
The developments in Oslo have contributed to a positive picture of Norwegian urban 
public transport in terms of patronage developments and social welfare gains up to 
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1997. Recurring operational problems in the second half of the 1990s clearly indicate 
that the operators in Oslo have approached their production capacity limits, and this had 
has an adverse effect on investments and maintenance.  
 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The public purse savings from reduced subsidies in seven Norwegian cities have had 
consequences for other actors. The operators have become more cost effective. This 
indicates that it was “right” to reduce subsidies. When it was no longer possible to 
reduce costs to the same extent, operators either reduced their profit margins or 
transferred costs to other actors. The passengers have had to bear the brunt of this cost, 
mainly through increased fares but also through reduced frequency. Society in general 
has also had to bear costs due to a modal shift from public transport to private car 
traffic. 
 
It is the development since 1997 that makes this picture dramatic, but this is not 
necessarily a long-term trend. On the other hand, the short-term focus on cost efficiency 
gains may lead to an unsustainable development, because operators are forced to 
postpone necessary maintenance costs and investments. The other option for operators 
is to reduce the service level and increase fares, which may lead to a loss of market 
share for public transport, and declining social welfare. 
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Figure A.1: Trends in subsidies per vehicle kilometre. 1986=1.00. The dotted line is a weighted 
average of the seven cities. 
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Figure A.2: Trends in operating costs per vehicle-kilometre. 1986=1.00. The dotted line is a 
weighted average of the seven cities. 
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Figure A.3: Trends in fare levels, calculated as total fare box revenues divided by number of 
passengers. 1986=1,00. The dotted line is a weighted average of the seven cities 
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Figure A.4: Passenger trips per capita. 1986=1,00. The dotted line is weighted average 
of the seven cities 
